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INTRODUCTION

When writing about copyright law, scholars and judges frequently
focus on its ability to create economic incentives for creativity. This
function derives from the constitutional purpose of copyright: "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' To provide individuals with incentives to produce creative works, copyright grants authors
a bundle of rights: to reproduce their works, to prepare derivative works,
and to distribute copies.2 Creators of works that can be performed (e.g.,
literary or choreographic works) also have the exclusive right to perform
their works,3 and makers of works that can be displayed (e.g., motion
pictures and pictorial, graphical, or sculptural works) have that exclusive
right as well.4 By granting authors this set of exclusive rights, copyright
law enables them to license others (for a fee) to use their works, allowing
authors to realize a return on the investment they make to create the
works in the first place.
A less frequently emphasized function of copyright is protecting
authors' privacy rights. In their seminal article, Warren and Brandeis
described the ability of common law copyright to prevent the world from
peering into the nonpublic aspects of individuals' lives.5 Under common
law copyright, the author of an unpublished work had exclusive control
over the work's publication.6 Copyrights, however, also allowed one

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164, 1169
(1994); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 428 (1984).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)-(3) (1994). A description of the types of works entitled to copyright
protection, described in § 2 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994), is beyond the scope of
this Article, except to note that copyright protection applies to a broadly defined class of original
and creative works that includes literary and artistic works, computer programs, and the
nonfunctional aspects of works of design.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5).
4. Id. § 106(5).
5. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193
(1890). For further discussion on the relationship between copyright and privacy, see infra part W.A.
6. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 200.
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who had a catalog of private possessions to prevent the catalog itself
from being distributed, notwithstanding the fact that the catalog had little
or no intellectual substance. The purpose of this rule was to protect an
individual's privacy, so that the world would not learn the content of
one's possessions. 7 Modem copyright, by enabling authors to control the
sale, distribution, and production of derivative works based on their
original creations, similarly allows authors to control the way their works
are presented to the world
The privacy-protecting role of copyright has consistently been
subordinated in judicial opinion and commentaries to copyright's ability
to provide economic incentives. 9 As the Supreme Court describes it,
"[t]he rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors
to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors."'" Similarly,
according to the Court, the limited grant of copyright protection "is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward."" In a more recent, well-publicized
copyright infringement battle, a district court expressed a similar
sentiment: "Copyright affords an incentive to authors, the guarantee that
free-riders will not be able to appropriate the revenues needed to recoup
the author's investment in creativity."' 2
This Article argues that courts' focus on the incentive-generating
aspect of copyright is both disingenuous and bad policy. It is disingenuous because a distinct line of copyright cases involving the doctrine of
fair use demonstrates that copyright law responds to privacy-protecting
interests as well as to economic interests. Specifically, courts have found

7. Id. at 201-05.

8. This aspect of copyright protection is known as the "moral right" or "author's right" and
is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). Analytically this is a distinct purpose from protecting an
author's privacy: The privacy aspect of copyright can be invoked to completely prevent any
reproduction of an author's private work, while the ability to control distribution and the production
of derivative works allows authors to specify that if a work is to be copied, it must be copied in such
a way so as to avoid distortion, modification, or mutilation prejudicial to the integrity of the work
and the author's reputation. See id.
9. See discussion infra parts II.B, III.
10. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
11. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
12. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(Walker, J.), affd, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1176 (1995). For popular
press coverage of the Apple v. Microsoft case, see John Markoff, Ruling Restricts Software Copyright
Protection,N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1992, at D 1;Jane Morrissey, JudgeReviews Issues in Apple's HPMicrosoft Suit, PC WEEK, May 18, 1992, at 189; Jonathan Weber, Apple Case Ruling to Aid

Software Developers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1992, at D2. The author served as a law clerk to Judge
Walker from 1994 to 1995, after the substantive motions in the Apple case were decided.
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in favor of expansive copyright protections in cases that implicate
privacy interests when narrower protections would have clearly been
dictated by the underlying economics. A purely economics-oriented
approach to copyright law also creates bad public policy by improperly
equating the drive for creativity with the desire for economic gain. Not
all creative works are made with economic gain in mind. The ultimate
goal of copyright, as recognized by the Supreme Court and leading
scholars, is to increase the social store of creative works. 3 In circumstances in which an author's privacy is strongly implicated, an economic
incentive-based approach to copyright, and more specifically fair use,
threatens this objective by discouraging authors from engaging in creative
activity.
By analyzing cases involving the doctrine of fair use, this Article
hopes to bring to the fore the privacy-protecting role of copyright law.
Fair use cases, I argue, highlight the essential role of privacy analysis in
copyright law and demonstrate why privacy protection is important to
copyright's underlying policies. Part II of this Article examines the
statutory basis of fair use and the Supreme Court's recent fair use
jurisprudence. The difficulties and inconsistencies of the Court's
approach to fair use point to the need for a clear theoretical understanding of the policies behind the doctrine. Part I explores the leading
scholarly interpretations of fair use. It then tests these theories by
applying them to fair use cases that involve works which implicate their
creators' privacy interests. The result is that the theories fail: Courts' fair
use decisions in a significant group of cases show that more is at play in
fair use analysis than the economics-oriented analysis used by scholars
and the Supreme Court. Part IV introduces a framework for including
privacy analysis into the scheme of copyright and shows how courts' fair
use analyses fall within the framework. Finally, Part V discusses the
benefits of incorporating privacy analysis in fair use cases and responds
to some criticisms of this approach.
A secondary purpose of this Article is to reduce some of the
uncertainty that currently attends courts' application of the fair use
doctrine. As Part II shows, fair use cases are unpredictable; courts with
similar factual cases often reach opposite conclusions while appearing to
engage in identical analyses. An underlying premise of this Article is that

13. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 545 (noting that "copyright is intended to increase and not
to impede the harvest of knowledge"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 . LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
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uncertainty in the effect of legal rules on private parties is bad for society
as a whole. Uncertainty prevents parties from conducting their business
efficiently, hampers private ordering, and spawns litigation. Hopefully,
by illuminating the rationales underlying courts' fair use decisions and
bringing to the fore the importance of privacy in courts' fair use
analyses, this Article can help reduce some of the uncertainty that
surrounds the fair use doctrine.
II.

FAIR USE IN UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW

A.

An Overview of the Doctrine

Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement; 4
accordingly, the scope of fair use reflects the limits of copyright
protection.' 5 In essence, a defendant in an infringement action argues
that, while he may have infringed the plaintiff's copyright, he did so in
a way that is justified (begging the question, for now, of what justifies
it). Paradigmatic examples of fair use are listed in section 107 of the
Copyright Act' 6 and include criticism, comment, and news reporting.
Courts, however, are not limited by these specified examples and have
recently expanded fair use to include uses bearing little resemblance to
the statutory categories. " Courts have also refused to find fair use in
cases where the use in question was one of the statutory uses. 8
In recent years, the significance of fair use within the overall
scheme of copyright has increased dramatically. The question of what
uses are fair has become increasingly important, as fair use has been

14. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994). But cf. Wendy J.
Gordon, FairUse as Market Failure:A Structuraland Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and
its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1626 (1982) ("Fair use has been variously regarded as

a 'defense,' as a 'privilege,' or as a use that is noninfringing." (footnotes omitted)).
15. See ROBERTA. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW 93 (1991) (describing fair use as "perhaps the
most significant limitation on the exclusive rights held by a copyright owner").
16. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).

17. See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding fair
use in case involving the copying of commercial software by a competitor); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582

(1993).
18. See, e.g., American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(research), petition for cert.filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. Apr. 24, 1995) (No. 94-1726); Los
Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992) (news reporting); Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.) (scholarship), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); Hi-Tech Video
Prods. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (news reporting), rev'd on

other grounds, 58 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1995).
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invoked to protect a wide range of otherwise infringing activities, from
photocopying portions of scholarly works for research purposes, 19 to

recording television broadcasts on VCRs for home use,2 ° to copying
video game software in order to design other software compatible with
a competitor's video game console units. 2' A distinct group of cases
have attempted to define limits for appropriate but unauthorized uses of
unpublished letters in scholarship or news reporting.'
The importance of fair use is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
willingness to take up four significant fair use cases in the last decade.23

Despite the relatively large number of fair use cases in the last several
years, and despite Congress's relatively recent codification of the fair use
doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976,24 fair use remains one of the
most troubling and confused doctrines in all of copyright law.25
Fair use developed as an equitable rule at common law2 6 and was
first incorporated into the copyright statute as section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976, which reads:

19. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S.
376 (1975).
20. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
21. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1510.
22. See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991); New Era Publications Int'l
v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); Salinger,
811 F.2d at 90; Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978); Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Lish v. Harper's Magazine
Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
23. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994); Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207 (1990); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony, 464 U.S.
417. The Court has also touched briefly on fair use issues in other cases decided in the past decade.
See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 541
n.19 (1987); Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207,217,226 (1985); Regan v. Time, Inc. 468 U.S.
641, 698 n.l (1984) (Stevens, J.).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
25. See Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (stating that fair
use "is the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright"); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (describing fair use as being "so flexible as virtually
to defy definition"); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NimMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05
(1994).

26. See generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE INCOPYRIGHT LAW (2d ed.
1995). Patry's book thoroughly traces the history of fair use, from its earliest applications to the
present. Readers interested in this aspect of fair use are encouraged to consult it. Apparently, early
fair use cases, which concerned abridgments (now called compilations), had little to say about the
privacy interests of the authors whose works were compiled. As this Article focuses on the modem
application of fair use, references to the development of the doctrine are intended to provide useful
background only.
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Notwithstanding the [exclusive rights granted to copyright
owners], the fair use of a copyrighted work... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.27
Several things are worth noting about the statute. First, the four
statutory factors are nonexclusive but mandatory. Courts must consider
all of them in making a fair use determination, but the statute offers no
guidance on how courts should consider them, how much weight they
should give to any particular one, or how they should be balanced
generally. Nor must courts rest a fair use determination solely on the four
factors; courts are free to consider other factors, such as a defendant's
inequitable conduct or bad faith.2 8 In addition, the paradigmatic
examples listed in the first sentence of the statute--e.g., news reporting,
criticism, scholarship-are not necessarily fair uses. A court could, after
considering the four factors and anything else it likes, decide that a
particular use of a work in scholarship or news reporting is not a fair use,
notwithstanding that those uses are listed in the statute. 29
The vagueness of section 107 is the result of a deliberate effort by
Congress to incorporate fair use into the Copyright Act in a way that
would merely preserve the common law definition of fair use as it
existed at the time the statute was written. Both the House and Senate

27.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).

28. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d

432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986); Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137,
1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
29. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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reports addressing the 1976 Copyright Act note that section 107 does not
purport to define fair use: "The statement of the fair use doctrine in
section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining when the
principles of the doctrine apply .... [T]he courts must be free to adapt
30
the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis."
B.

The Supreme Court's FairUse Analysis:
Focusing on Economics

Of the four fair use cases ruled upon by the Supreme Court in the
past decade,3 three have played significant roles in the shaping of
modem fair use law. In each of these cases, the Court has placed fair use
within an analytical framework in which the outcomes of the cases
turned on the role that fair use would play in copyright's scheme of
economic incentives.
The Court's first major fair use case was Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 2 In Sony, several movie studios
that owned copyrights in works broadcasted on television sued Sony, the
manufacturer of the first widely commercialized VCR. The studios
alleged that Sony, by marketing the means by which individuals could
make unauthorized copies of the studios' copyrighted works, was a
contributory copyright infringer.3 3 The Court disagreed, holding that
Sony could not be liable as a contributory infringer if its VCRs were
"capable of substantial noninfringing uses."3 4 Sony's liability for
contributory infringement therefore turned on whether VCRs could be
used in a way that was noninfringing.
To make this determination, the Sony Court applied the section 107
four factor analysis to the use the district court had determined was the

30. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 66 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994) (citing the legislative history of § 107). For a thorough
description of the legislative history of § 107, see PATRY, supra note 26, at 261-366.
3 1. See supra note 23.
32. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
33. Unlike the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994), "[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly
render anyone liable for infringement committed by another." Sony, 464 U.S. at 434. However, "It]he
absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of

liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the
infringing activity." Id. at 435. See Kelly Tickle, Comment, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic
Bulletin Board Operatorsfor the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80

IOWA L. REv. 391, 397 (1995) (discussing the differences between liability for contributory
infringement under the Copyright Act and the Patent Act).
34. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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predominant use of VCRs, time-shifting of broadcast programs for later
home viewing. If time-shifting was a fair use, then Sony would not be
liable as a contributory infringer, as VCRs would then be capable of
noninfringing uses.3" In deciding whether this use was in fact fair use,
the Court focused on the effect that time-shifting had on the potential
market for the movie studios' copyrighted works. "The purpose of
copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying for
noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to
obtain the rewards that Congress intended him to have."36 In analyzing
section 107's four factors, the Court noted that noncommercial uses, like
time-shifting for home use, are presumptively fair because they do not
carry an economic threat.3 7 In the end, the Court affirmed the district
court's findings that the copyright owners had not adequately demonstrated actual harm or the threat of future harm, leading to the conclusion
that time-shifting for home use was fair. Time-shifting, according to the
Court, did not have a sufficiently adverse impact on the incentive system
of copyright to constitute infringement.3"
The Court next considered fair use in Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,39 in which The Nation's unauthorized
publication of excerpts from ex-President Ford's soon-to-be-published
memoirs caused "limemagazine, which had purchased pre-publication
rights to print excerpts of Ford's work, to cancel its contract, creating a
$12,500 loss for Harper & Row, Ford's publisher.40 The Nation offered
a number of arguments to support the conclusion that its publication of
the Ford diaries was fair use: The Nation's use fell within the statutorily
protected category of news reporting; Ford's diaries were factual works
deserving less copyright protection than works of fancy; The Nation
copied an insubstantial portion of the diaries; and the impact on the
market for the diaries was minimal.4"
The Second Circuit accepted this argument,42 but the Supreme

35. Id. at 442, 447. Technically, time-shifting would still be an unauthorized use that would
otherwise support a finding of infringement, but the use would be allowed because it was fair. The
Court glossed over this point.

36. Id. at 450.
37. Id. at 449.
38. Id. at 450-55.
39. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
40. Id. at 542-43.
41. Id. at 545.
42. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471 U.S.
539 (1985).
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Court disagreed.43 The Court's analysis emphasized the economic
incentives for the production of creative or historically valuable works
inherent in copyright law.' "[A] fair use doctrine that permits extensive
prepublication quotations from an unreleased manuscript without the
copyright owner's consent poses substantial potential for damage to the
marketability of first serialization rights .... ."' In making this argument, the Court implicitly acknowledged that the value of the prepublication rights to print excerpts from his biography figured into ex-President
Ford's decision to write his memoirs in the first place.46 Because the
Court saw a direct connection between The Nation's acts and a possible
erosion in the incentive system of copyright,7 the Court found that The
Nation was not merely engaging in news reporting but had created a
newsworthy event by "exploit[ing] the headline value of its infringement."4 To emphasize the primacy of economic incentives in fair use
cases, the Court declared that the fourth fair use factor--the effect of the
use on the value of the original work-is "undoubtedly the most
important element of fair use."' 9
The Court's most recent fair use case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., ° can be read as backtracking some from the strong
language of Harper& Row." Nevertheless, the Court again stressed the
importance of protecting copyright's economic incentives for authors in
cases raising fair use. Petitioner, the popular rap group "2 Live Crew,"
had recorded a parody of Roy Orbison's and William Dees' rock and roll
chestnut, "Oh, Pretty Woman." Acuff-Rose, to whom Orbison and Dees
had assigned their copyrights, sued 2 Live Crew for copyright infringe-

43. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539-40.
44. Id. at 546 (noting that the exclusive grant of copyright 'is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward' (quoting Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984))).
45. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569.

46. See id. at 542 (discussing in detail Ford's negotiations with Harper & Row Publishers "to
publish his as yet unwritten memoirs").
47. Id. at 566-69.
48. Id. at 561.
49. Id. at 566. It is significant to note that under the Court's analysis, potential as well as
actual harm to the market for the original copyrighted work would weigh against fair use. Id. at 568.
50. 114S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
51. The Court in Campbell,unlike the Court in Harper& Row, made no sweeping declaration
of the preeminence of the fourth factor-effect on the market for the original--instead indicating that
a more balanced approach was appropriate: "Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in
isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the
purposes of copyright." Id. at 1170-71.
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ment, and the group responded by raising the fair use defense.52 In
analyzing section 107's four factors, the Court noted that the OrbisonDees original was a creative work that fell "within the core
of... copyright's protective purposes. 53 The Court also reemphasized
its finding in Sony that a commercial use weighs against a finding of fair
use. 54 Regarding the third factor--the amount and substantiality of the
portions taken--the Court noted that a paradist will by necessity copy
those portions of the original work that make it recognizable. Thus, the
determination whether the third factor weighs against fair use in parody
depends largely on the analysis of the fourth factor.5 In light of this
analysis of the first three factors, it is clear that the Court's fair use
determination, as in Sony, came down to the fourth factor. Because 2
Live Crew had not presented evidence of the effect of its work on the
market for nonparody rap versions of "Oh, Pretty Woman," and because
Acuff-Rose had not presented evidence that the potential rap market for
the song was harmed, the Court refused to rule on this all-important
factor and remanded the case for additional fact-finding. 6
The Court's fair use decisions have been guided by a fear that
overexpansive fair use would sap copyright law of its incentive effects.
In every case it considered, the Court performed its statutory duty of
analyzing each of section 107's four factors, but the Court has emphasized, as it is not required to do by the statute, that the fourth factor--the
impact on the potential market value of the plaintiff's work-is to
receive the most weight. While the Court often purports to use fair use
"'to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion,

52. Id. at 1168.
53. Id. at 1175.
54. Id. at 1174.
55. See id at 1176. In deciding whether the amount taken by the defendants was reasonable
under the third factor of the fair use analysis, the court observed that "how much ...is reasonable
will depend ...on the extent to which the song's overriding purpose and character is to parody the
original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve as a market substitute for the
original.' Id.
56. Id. at 1178-79.
57. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236-38 (1990); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). But cf.Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (indicating that the factors
are to be given approximately equal weight). Emphasis on the fourth factor--the impact of the use
on the actual or potential value of the copyrighted work-has become a mainstay of lower courts'
fair use analyses. See eg., Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d
Cir. 1993); McGowan v. Cross, Nos. 92-1480, 92-1584, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 9134, at *6 (4th Cir.
Apr. 22) (unpublished decision), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 291 (1993); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1582 (1993).
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it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster,'"" in actuality the analysis always turns on the economic harm
suffered by the plaintiff. As Professor Fisher describes it, "[t]he fair use
doctrine enables the judiciary to permit unauthorized uses of copyrighted
works in particular situations when doing so will result in wider
dissemination of those works without seriously eroding the incentives for
artistic and intellectual innovation. ' 9
If the purpose of fair use is to protect copyright's incentive scheme,
one must ask whether the four factors in section 107 provide the best
framework for doing so. The answer is that they do not. As proof, one
need only look at how the different courts reach contradictory results in
almost identical factual settings.' Even the Supreme Court's emphasis
upon fair use's fourth factor and its attention to the competitive effect of
a use do not always dictate the final disposition of a case. Courts can
vary their results by changing the scope of their competitive inquiries
under the fourth fair use factor, asking whether the allegedly infringing
work fulfilled a market that the owner of the copyright in the original
work had actually exploited or whether the second work fulfilled a
market that the original copyright owner could have exploited.
Two song parody cases illustrate this difference. In Fisher v.
Dees,62 the defendant infringed the plaintiff's song, "When Sunny Gets
Blue," with his own commercial rendition, "When Sonny Sniffs Glue."
Regarding section 107's fourth factor, the Fisher court directed its
inquiry to whether the defendant's work 'fulfills the demand for the
original."'63 The Ninth Circuit in Fisher concluded that the original and
the defendant's works were not commercially substitutable because they
were directed at different markets.( Based on this analysis, the Ninth

58. Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236 (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
59. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the FairUse Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1659,

1687 (1988).
60. See Brian R. Landy, Comment, The Two Strands of the Fair Use Web: A Theory for
Resolving the Dilemma of Music Parody,54 OHIO ST. L.J. 227, 23746 (1993) (comparing district
courts' dissimilar treatments of Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn.
1991), rev'd,972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994), and Tin Pan Apple, Inc.
v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
61. To complicate matters, the Court's most recent fair use case has de-emphasized the
importance of the fourth statutory factor. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1177.
62. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
63. Id. at 438.
64. Id.
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Circuit held the defendant's use to be fair.65
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson" involved a similar infringement: a knock-off

of "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B," entitled, "Cunnilingus
Champion of Company C." The Second Circuit in Wilson differed from

the Fisher court in its analysis of the fourth factor, focusing not only on
whether the defendant's work fulfilled the demand for the original, but
also on whether the two works could be seen as competitors in a broader
sense: "Both Bugle Boy and Cunnilingus Champion were performed on
the stage. Both were sold as recordings. Both were sold in printed
copies."67 Based on this analysis, the Second Circuit held that the use

was not fair.6"

65. Regarding the first factor, the Fisher court held that while the defendant's use was
commercial, that need not be fatal to a fair use claim. A commercial use merely shifts the burden
to the defendant to show that his use did not harm the value of the plaintiff's work, a question addressed under the fourth factor. Id. at 437. The court did not explicitly analyze the second
factor--the nature of the copyrighted work-but the work was clearly a creative work which, under
common fair use analysis, is afforded greater protection than factual works. The court made a
detailed discussion of the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the work taken, and found
that this factor weighed in favor of fair use under the specific circumstances of the case. Id. at 43839.
66. 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 185.
68. Unlike the Fishercourt, the Wilson court indicated that, while a commercial use tends to
weigh against a finding of fair use, a commercial use and fair use "can exist side by side." Id. at
182. The court also noted that whether the copyrighted work was a creative original work was a
factor to be considered in the fair use analysis. Id. Regarding the third factor-the amount of the
copyrighted work taken-the court suggested that "excessive" copying will preclude fair use and
refused to overturn the district court's factual finding of excessive copying, while indicating that it
might not have found the amount of copying excessive had it been analyzing the issue "de novo"
instead of under a "clearly erroneous" standard. Id. at 185.
It is possible to rationalize the conflicting opinions in Fisherand Wilson by resorting to rigid
formalism. The Fishercourt analyzed "When Sonny Sniffs Glue" as a parody, while the Wilson
court explicitly held that "Cunnilingus Champion" was not. Fisher,794 F.2d at 439 n.5. While it
may be true that fair use should be given wider scope in instances of social satire than in knock-off
works made solely for their entertainment value, the works in question in these two cases are too
similar for the difference in outcomes to rest on this distinction. Rather, the Ninth Circuit's decision
to label "When Sonny Sniffs Glue" a parody in light of the Second Circuit's refusal to similarly
label "Cunnilingus Champion" can be seen as a way for the Ninth Circuit to justify the fair use
decision that it had already reached and a convenient way of distinguishing a remarkably similar case
that reached the opposite conclusion. The ultimate insignificance of the label "parody" to the fair
use analysis is further demonstrated by the fact that, although "parody" is one of the statutory fair
uses, a finding that a work is a parody does not guarantee a finding of fair use. See supra text
accompanying notes 28-30. Also, while the Fishercourt labeled the defendant's work a parody, it
still considered the fact that the defendant's work was commercial in holding that the first
factor-the nature of the defendant's work-weighed againsta finding of fair use. Fisher,794 F.2d
at 436-37. Thus, to argue that Fishercan be distinguished from Wilson on the ground that one case
involved a parody while the other did not begs the essential question: When is a commercial knock-
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The result of the inherent flexibility in fair use analysis is an
indeterminate body of case law in which judges can easily manipulate
their analyses to reach the outcome they desire. As Judge Leval, who has
written several fair use opinions, has noted, "[e]arlier decisions provide
little basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are
commonplace. The opinions reflect widely differing notions of the
meaning of fair use. Decisions are not governed by consistent principles,
but seem69rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual fact
patterns."
So what is a district court judge to do? Unfortunately, the answer
is often unclear, and the results can be unpredictable. In Ginn v.
Joyce,7" for example, the defendants, members of a musical group that
was engaged in a widely publicized dispute with its record company,7 1
published a magazine designed to present their version of that dispute
and to critique the commercial music industry generally, uses that
arguably fall within section 107's presumptively favored categories of
criticism, comment, or news reporting. The magazine reproduced several
documents authored by the record company: letters, standard legal
documents, two press releases, and a bumper sticker. The record
company sued the group for infringing its copyrights in those works.72
After a cursory romp through section 107's four factors, the district court
judge rejected the group's fair use defense, primarily because the group
sold the magazine: "[T]he items were reprinted in a magazine and sold
for profit. Even though the items held no commercial value for the
plaintiffs, they delivered profit to the defendants. The fair use doctrine

off of a popular song fair use?
69. Pierre N. Leval, Towarda Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (1990)
(Commentary) (footnotes omitted); see also Gary L. Francione, Facing The Nation: The Standards
for Copyright, Infringement, and FairUse of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 543 (1986)
(noting that "courts often apply [§ 107's] criteria inconsistently and incomprehensibly"). But see Jay
Dratler, Jr., Distillingthe Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMi L. REV. 233
(1988) (arguing that courts can develop a coherent and consistent fair use doctrine simply by
applying the four statutory factors). The uncertainty created by the indeterminacy of fair use has had
a detrimental effect on the publishing industry, among others. See Karen B. LeFevre, The Tell-Tale
"Heart":Determining "Fair"Use of UnpublishedTexts, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 168-69

(1992).
70. Ginn v. Joyce, No. 92-6692 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1993) (order denying in part and granting
in part defendant's motion for summary judgment).
7 1. See, e.g., Jeffrey Jolson-Colbum, Negativland, U2 Scrap Takes Bizarre Twists, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 30, 1992, at B7; Richard Harrington, News From Negativland, wASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1992, at
C7; Deborah Russell, No Positivesfor Negativlandin "U2" Settlement, BILLBOARD, Dec. 7, 1991,
at 49.
72. Ginn, No. 92-6692 at 2.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss1/3

14

COPYRIGHT, PRIVACY
AND FAIR Privacy,
USE
Thau: Copyright,
and Fair Use

1995]

is not a defense for copyright infringement."73 Come again?

mH.

INCENTIVES AND FAIR USE: ATTEMPTS TO
RATIONALIZE THE DOCTRINE

Courts and commentators have embraced two economics-based
modes of analysis to describe fair use. First are microeconomic
explanations that focus on transaction costs or other forms of market
failures that prevent wealth-maximizing copyright owners and users from
arriving at the "natural" state of affairs that would obtain in the absence
of a fair use doctrine. 4 Second is a macroeconomic public benefit
model in which fair use is justified by social gain, sometimes at the
expense of individual profit.75 For the reasons set forth below, however,
neither of these approaches is adequate to explain fair use law as it
presently exists.
A.

Microeconomic Explanations of Fair Use

Starting from the premise that "[s]triking the correct balance
between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright
law,176 Professor Landes and Judge Posner utilize an economic model
to argue that fair use can be explained as one of the ways copyright law
maximizes public welfare.7 7 Landes and Posner note that the cost of a
copyright owner's enforcement of his rights will often exceed either his
own damages or the value that his would-be defendant obtains from
making use of his work.78 The example they give is of A wanting to
quote from B's work. A might gladly pay B a royalty that B would
accept, but the costs of negotiating such a transaction exceed the amount
that would change hands.79 Limited classroom use of a copyrighted
work would presumably fall into this category. Fair use enables parties
to use copyrighted works without authorization under these circumstances. Landes and Posner also use transaction costs to explain why fair use
may sometimes allow the widespread use of a copyrighted work where
each individual use is of relatively little value to the user or of little
73. Id. at 6-7.
74. See Gordon, supra note 14; Landes & Posner, supranote 13; Leval, supra note 69.
75. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994); Leval, supra note
69, at 1107-10.
76. Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 326.

77. See id. at 357-61.
78. See id. at 357-58.

79. Id. at 357.
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detriment to the copyright holder: "Often, users are numerous, and this
would make for a high cost of arranging compensation and a large
number of legal proceedings."' Ultimately, Landes and Posner argue
that fair use should be narrowly construed based on the transaction cost
theory to situations in which "the benefits of the use exceed the costs of
copyrighted protection."'" Otherwise, they argue, fair use will sap the
incentive effects of copyright.82
Professor Gordon undertakes a similar analysis of fair use, arguing
that fair use should be found only: (1) if a market failure prevents the
parties from effectively negotiating an appropriate license; (2) if the
transfer of rights is socially desirable; and (3) if there is no substantial
injury to the plaintiff's creative incentives.83 The second and third
factors are both standard ingredients in courts' fair use recipes."
Gordon's primary contribution to fair use scholarship lies in her emphasis
on the market failure aspects of fair use.
Gordon insists that market failure be a prerequisite to a finding of
fair use. She offers three distinct categories of such failure--transaction
costs, externalities, and antidissemination incentives.8 Her transaction
cost analysis 86 is similar to that of Landes and Posner.87 Her
externalities argument works as follows: Because the full benefit of the
use of a copyrighted work may not inure to the user of the work (i.e.,
some of the benefit goes to society at large and is therefore externalized),
if the owner of the copyright insists on a royalty approaching the full
value of the work to all users, no individual user will be willing to pay
the royalty.88 The work will therefore go unused, and all will suffer by
not having had the benefit of this use.89 Antidissemination incentives
arise because certain uses of copyrighted works, namely criticism, are
inherently disfavored by copyright owners, who are90 generally unwilling
to allow their works to be used for these purposes.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 358.
Id.
Id.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1614.
See infra part III.C.
Gordon, supra note 14, at 1627-35.

86. Id. at 1628-30.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
88. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1630-31.

89.

Id. at 1630-32.

90. Id. at 1632-34; see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1178 (1994)
("[The unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of

their own productions removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.").
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B.

Deficiencies of Microeconomics-BasedFair Use Theories

While appealing in the abstract, transaction cost or other market
failure theories of fair use cannot adequately explain the doctrine as
courts currently implement it. Transaction cost arguments, 9 for
instance, only justify individuals' reliance on the fair use defense when
engaging in very limited sorts of otherwise infringing activities, like
photocopying copyrighted works for classroom use. Consider a professor
who wishes to distribute a copyrighted work in her class. Without fair
use, she will not do so, either out of collegial respect for the original
work of a fellow academic, or because of a fear that she will be sued for
copyright infringement. Copyright without fair use could therefore
exercise a chilling effect on the desirable distribution of copyrighted
works. Fair use eliminates this chilling effect by telling the professor that
it is all right for her to distribute the work, notwithstanding the fact that
someone else owns the copyright.
Fair use functions in this context primarily on the mind of the
copyright infringer, the professor handing out a work in class. In all
likelihood, the professor could hand out the work without fair use and
with impunity. By hypothesis in the Landes and Posner fair use model,
the professor's use is one in which the potential plaintiff's costs of
seeking out and enforcing the copyright exceed his possible losses,
making a lawsuit very unlikely. Under these circumstances, where the
costs of copyright enforcement exceed the plaintiff's potential gain from
bringing suit, there is no need for a special doctrine in copyright law to
say that the defendant's use is allowed. The plaintiff simply won't bother
to sue, and the defendant will be able to continue the infringing use free
from the threat of potentially costly litigation. If courts took seriously
Landes' and Posner's suggestion to limit fair use to cases in which the
benefit of the use accruing to an alleged infringer is outweighed by the
costs of enforcement borne by the copyright owner, we would hardly
expect to see any cases in which the fair use defense is successfully
raised. The plaintiffs in those cases would lack the economic incentive
to sue, and if a suit did occur, a defendant would be wiser to settle rather
than raise an expensive defense like fair use. The fact that fair use is
successfully invoked in a large number of suits in which the transaction
cost rationale simply does not apply-e.g., where the defendant can

91.

See supra text accompanying notes 78-82, 86-89.
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easily identify the would-be plaintiff ex ante and would be willing to
negotiate a license 9 -indicates that courts view fair use as more than
merely a means of avoiding costly negotiating.
Professor Gordon's market failure analysis suffers similar shortcomings. Her externalities argument, which would find fair use when the
benefits of a use are not internalized to the user, can be viewed as
another type of transaction cost argument, with transaction costs existing
as a barrier to negotiation between groups of users of copyrighted works
rather than between users and owners of those works. Externalities
cannot be captured under Gordon's theory because they are diffuse. If all
of those who benefit from a particular externality-creating use could band
together, however, the externalities could be captured. Presumably, such
banding is not possible because of the transaction costs inherent in
bringing the users together or the collection costs of obtaining a fair
royalty from each user.
It is unlikely that externalities play a significant role in actual fair
use cases. If the use in question is extremely valuable to a group of
would-be users, and the royalty that would be paid by them is sufficiently high, the users would likely band together and pool the necessary
royalty. In short, for high value uses, externalities do not cause market
failure. This leaves low value uses, which run into the same problem as
Landes' and Posner's transaction cost argument: If the value of the use
to the parties involved is low, an expensive lawsuit is unlikely, and an
expensive and uncertain defense even less so.
Gordon's observation that antidissenination incentives provide a
limited justification for fair use is no doubt correct: without this aspect
of fair use we would almost never expect to see critical reviews of
artistic works that reproduce portions of the works or parodies that
disparage a copyrighted work.9 3 Still, this rationale covers only particu-

92. See, e.g., Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168; Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 811 F.2d 90, 92
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987). In each of these cases, the defendant sought but was
denied a license from the plaintiff. While the plaintiffs' refusals to license their works may indicate
that the defendants were not willing to pay enough, it is also possible that the plaintiffs simply
preferred not to have their works used as the defendants wanted to use them. In economic terms, the
plaintiffs were acting irrationally by not earning possible positive returns, creating a type of market
failure that we would expect an efficiency-enhancing law to rectify by allowing the work to be put
into use through the fair use doctrine. The fact that fair use was not allowed in Salinger and may
not be allowed in Campbell on remand indicates that there is more going on in fair use analysis than

efficiency-promoting cost-benefit analysis. See infra part IV.
93. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1633 ("Even if money were offered, the owner of a play is

unlikely to license a hostile review or a parody of his own drama ... .') (footnote omitted); see also
Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1178 ("[T]here is no protectable derivative market for criticism. The market
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lar examples of fair use, such as criticism and parody. If this were all
that there were to fair use, we would have to ask whether fair use is truly
necessary-why have a broad and loosely defined doctrine that allows
for inconsistent outcomes? 94 Sections 107 through 120 of the Copyright
Act 5 contain detailed specific exemptions from copyright infringement.
A specific exemption for criticism or comment would easily perform this
function without all of the indeterminacy created by fair use.
C. Public Benefits Explanations of FairUse
The Supreme Court, lower courts, and commentators have endorsed
a public benefit model of fair use.96 According to this utilitarian
conception, fair use is to be found when the public benefit created by an
infringer's use of a copyrighted work exceeds the loss to the copyright
owner created by that particular use.97 Since society benefits from the
free flow of information, and because fair use encourages the dissemination of copyrighted works, fair use adds to the aggregate public good if
the value to the public of a use outweighs the individual harm it
creates.98 Courts frequently invoke this theory to justify findings of fair
use in cases involving so-called "productive" or "transformative" uses,
in which the defendant's work incorporates the plaintiff's in a way that
creates a new and different work. 99
The difficulty with this model is that section 107's four factors do
a poor job of focusing courts on public benefits of particular infringing
uses. While the paradigmatic examples of fair use in the section's first

for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general
develop or license others to develop.").
94. See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.

95. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-20 (1994).
96.
130, 146
97.
98.
99.

See, e.g., Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1171; Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp.
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Leval, supra note 69, at 1135-36.
See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1636 n.199.
See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.1.2 (1989).
See Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1177 (arguing that "transformative" uses of a work are less

likely to result in diminution of value of the original work than mere copying); Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,478-79 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Maxtone-Graham
v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1259 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,481 U.S. 1059 (1987). Judge Leval
makes the question whether a particular use was transformative central to his proposed standard for
fair use cases. See Leval, supra note 69, at 1111. But see Sony, 464 U.S. at 455-56 n.40 (noting that

"It]he distinction between 'productive' and 'unproductive' uses may be helpful in calibrating the [fair
use] balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative," and that "[t]he statutory language does not

identify any dichotomy between productive and nonproductive time-shifting, but does require
consideration of the economic consequences of copying").
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sentencel °° may be types of uses in which the public benefits often
outweigh a copyright holders losses, a finding that a use falls within one
of these categories does little to alter the fair use analysis. Courts must
still analyze each of the four factors, with hardly a presumption that these
particular uses should be fair."'1 Courts' heavy emphasis on the fourth
factor'o 2-- the potential impact on the market for the plaintiff's
work---pushes the inquiry back into the private realm: How much is this
plaintiff losing? The first factor-the purpose and character of the
use-leans towards a public benefit analysis. However, courts' frequent
emphasis on the second sentence of that factor, whether the use was
commercial, again shifts the inquiry back into private realm: Is the
defendant profiting financially from this use? 0 3 The third factor also
focuses only on the interests of the private litigants, asking how much of
the plaintiffs work did the defendant take.' 4
Only the courts' analyses of the second factor--the nature of the
work-which frequently note that factual works are afforded less
protection than fictional works or works of fancy, address an issue
consistent with a public benefit approach: factual works are more likely
to have public utility than fictional works. 5 But this is already recognized in copyright law through the idea/expression distinction.' One
can copyright only the expression of ideas or facts, not the ideas or facts

100. The examples listed include criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, and scholarship.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
101. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561 ("The fact that an article arguably is 'news' and
therefore a productive use is simply one factor in a fair use analysis."); Quinto v. Legal Times of

Wash., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554,560 (D.D.C. 1981) ("Use of copyrighted material in a news story may
constitute a fair use, but only if the court deems it so after considering the four factors listed in the
statute.").
102. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

103. See, e.g., Ginn v. Joyce, No. 92-6692 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1993) (order denying fair use
defense primarily because defendant's use was commercial). Courts' emphasis on the commercial
nature of the work in their analyses of the first factor is likely to diminish following Campbell, in
which the Court emphasized that the commercial nature of a work is only one factor to be weighed
in the balance. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174. Campbell's ability to refocus courts on more public
benefit-oriented aspects of the fair use inquiry is not certain, however, because it can be read as
emphasizing the public benefits of parody and criticism, and thus limited accordingly. Id. at 1173,
1178.

104. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994).
105. See Sony Corp. ofArn. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,496-97 (1984) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("[Ijnformational works, such as news reports, that readily lend themselves to
productive use by others, are less protected than creative works of entertainment.").
106. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss1/3

20

1995]

AND FAIR USE
COPYRIGH PRIVACY
Thau: Copyright,
Privacy,

and Fair Use

themselves. 7 The second fair use factor recognizes that separating
protectable expression from underlying ideas is especially difficult when
the underlying work is a factual work. Still, courts should engage in this
inquiry in determining what parts of the plaintiff's work deserve
copyright protection, not when in determining whether the defendant's
use of plaintiffs work was fair.'
Rather than balancing public benefits against private losses, courts
engaged in section 107's four factor fair use analysis use the doctrine's
flexibility to mix private and public benefits with private and public
harms. The result is the indeterminate, unpredictable body of fair use
law. Even if courts focused on public benefits and private losses, their
analyses would be problematic because of courts' inability to properly
quantify and compare these values. Private loss is usually the easier of
the two to compute, but even it is frequently speculative. Placing a dollar
value measure on the public benefit of a use is nearly impossible to do
with confidence.
D. Complicating the Puzzle: A Wider Perspective on the Caselaw
There is yet another reason to discount the predictive value of
economics-oriented fair use theories: they simply cannot explain some of
the caselaw. In several cases, courts have rejected a fair use defense
while acknowledging that the plaintiff was unlikely to have suffered any
real diminution in the value of his copyrighted works as a result of the
defendant's infringement. 1 9 In Salinger v. Random House, Inc.," 0 for
example, the reclusive author J.D. Salinger was able to enjoin publication
of a biography that included fragmented excerpts from his personal
letters. Similar cases have arisen around attempts to publish excerpts of
letters and diaries from various public figures, including Church of
Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard,"' composer and conductor Igor
Stravinsky, 2 and New York literary figure Gordon Lish." 3 What

107. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); Feist, 499 U.S. at 344 ("That there can be no valid copyright
in facts is universally understood.").
108. See Francione, supra note 69, at 578-79.
109. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir.) (holding that only a slight
degree of market impairment was likely), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); Lish, 807 F. Supp. at
1104 (holding that plaintiff had failed to establish the necessary likelihood of harm to prevail on the
fourth factor).
110. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
111. New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
112. Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

21

HOFSTRA
LAW REVIEW
[Vol.
Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1995], Art.
3

24:179

puts these cases even more at odds with the public benefit paradigm is
that, in each case, the use in question was either one of scholarship or
news reporting, uses which are likely to have significant public
benefits.1 4 According to the public benefit model, these are ideal cases
for the application of fair use: the public benefits from the scholarly or
news generating nature of the use and the plaintiff suffers little harm. For
example, in Lish, the district court specifically found that Lish suffered
no actual or potential economic harm," 5 and in Salinger, the court
declared that any potential harm was minimal. 6 Nevertheless, the
courts ruled against fair use.
It should also be noted that cases like Lish and Salinger cannot be
explained by the Landes and Posner or Gordon microeconomic fair use
theories. 7 The transaction costs in these cases were by no means
prohibitive; the parties were as identifiable as any who negotiate a
license, and there were no apparent obstacles to prevent them from
negotiating a mutually beneficial royalty, other than the copyright
owners' intransigence. While such intransigence can be viewed as an
example of Gordon's antidissemination incentives,' courts have been
inconsistent about finding fair use in these circumstances. 9 Moreover,
each case appears to be ideally situated for an application of Professor
Gordon's market failure analysis.12 Although Harper's printing of
Lish's letter was held to be news reporting, it was at least arguably a
kind of criticism and social comment. 2 1 All of these uses are ones that
Lish certainly did not intend to license, making a finding of fair use
particularly appropriate. The same can be argued for Salinger."
Economics-oriented analyses of fair use, then, do not paint the

113. Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
114. For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see infra part IV.A.
115. 807 F. Supp. at 1104.
116. 811 F.2dat99.
117. See supra part III.A.
118. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1633.
119. Compare Salinger, 811 F.2d at 90 (ordering issuance of preliminary injunction barring
publication of an unauthorized biography of reclusive author J.D. Salinger, containing a number of
his copyrighted, unpublished letters) with Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
311 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding in favor of dissemination of information about Howard Hughes over
Hughes' apparent objections through lifting of injunction restraining publication of Hughes'
biography), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
121. See Lish, 807 F. Supp. at 1097.
122. 811 F.2d at 96; see Lloyd L. weinreb, Fair'sFair:A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine,

103 HARv. L. REv. 1137, 1147-48 (1990) (discussing Professor Gordon's antidissemination motive
as a market failure that makes a finding of fair use particularly appropriate in cases like Salinger).
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whole picture of fair use. While a public benefit/utilitarian description
may be more complete, it is also so general that it loses all predictive
force, making it comfortable for scholars but not very helpful for those
who would like to know ex ante whether a particular use will be
considered fair. Some scholars, realizing this limitation, simply argue for
the doctrine to be applied equitably,"~ but courts and private party
litigants still need guidance about how this should be done. 24
IV. ADDING PRIVACY TO THE FAIR USE INQUIRY
The murkiness of the fair use doctrine is attributable in large part to
the fact that the defense has been invoked in a wide variety of contexts
bearing little resemblance to one another, such as commercial software
copying, song parodies, and scholarly use of unpublished letters. The
leading Supreme Court cases are of little guidance in many of these areas
because they arose in extreme and unusual fact patterns. Both Harper&
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises" and Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.t 26 centered around unique
commercial disputes: one involved outright piracy of the scoop value of
the publication of the Ford diaries-Victor Navasky with a purloined
manuscript;"' the other potentially determined the future of a multibillion dollar industry. 28 The Court's most recent fair use case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,29 involved a musical parody, the value
of which has been explicitly recognized by the courts. 3 '
These cases provide a framework for applying section 107's four

123. See Weinreb, supra note 122, at 1150-61 (arguing against a strictly utilitarian conception
of fair use in favor of a "fairness"-based approach).

124. See id. at 1161 (noting that such an equitable approach to fair use "calls for the exercise
of great
125.
126.
127.

judicial skill, or ar").
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 542-43.

128. Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
129. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
130. See id. at 1171-72; Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
plaintiff's "When Sonny Sniffs Glue" was a parody of "When Sunny Gets Blue" deserving fair use
protection and recognizing that ""[d]estructive" parodies play an important role in social and literary
criticism and thus merit protection even though they may discourage or discredit an original author"'

(quoting Note, The ParodyDefense to Copyright Infringement. ProductiveFairUse After Betamax,
97 HARv. L. REV. 1395, 1411 (1984))); Elsemere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F.
Supp. 741,745 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that Saturday Night Live's use of plaintiff's song "I Love New
York" to create the parody "I Love Sodom" constituted fair use and acknowledging that "[ijt has
been held that an author is entitled to more extensive use of another's copyrighted work in creating
a parody than in creating other ... works!), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
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statutory factors, but lower courts can manipulate this framework to reach
any result they desire. For instance, a common refrain of fair use cases
since Harper & Row has been that the fourth statutory factor-the
potential impact of the use on the market for the copyright owner's

work-is to receive the most weight.'

This pronouncement makes

great sense in a commercial context, but it is of little value when the
original work in dispute in a fair use case has little commercial value to
begin with, 13 2 as in Lish,'33 or where the allegedly infringing use is
solely to usurp the "scoop-value" for the original, as in
not intended
134
Salinger.
A.

Recognizing the Privacy Component of Fair Use

Cases like Lish and Salinger' suggest that simple commercial
impact or cost-benefit analyses of the fair use doctrine are inadequate to
explain fair use as courts employ it. Instead, I argue in this section that

courts also employ fair use to protect an author's privacy by giving him
the ability to control the reproduction and dissemination of works that
can be viewed as extensions of his personality.
While scholarship and the vast majority of judicial opinion
discussing fair use have focused almost exclusively on the role of fair

131. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566; supra note 57 and accompanying text.
132. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450 ("[A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the
author's incentive to create.'); see also Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 148
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that where an allegedly infringed-upon work has no value to its owner, the
fourth factor of § 107 "weighs entirely in the defendants' favor"). Occasionally, courts draw the
negative inference from Sony and Harper & Row that if a use does not reduce the value of the
copyrighted work, it must be fair. See N.A.D.A. Servs. Corp. v. Business Data of Va., 651 F. Supp.
44, 48 (E.D. Va. 1986) ("A use which does not materially impair the marketability of the
copyrighted work will be deemed fair." (citing Harper& Row)); cf Francione, supranote 69, at 543
("In the context of factual works, there is particular confusion as courts attempt to weigh as a fair
use factor the 'public interest' involved in the dissemination of factual works, or the 'necessity' of
a particular use .... ").
133. 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
134. See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96 ('The proposed use is not an attempt to rush to the market
just ahead of the copyright holder's imminent publication, as occurred in Harper& Row").
135. For similar fair use analyses, see New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d
576 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that unauthorized excerpting of Church of Scientology founder L. Ron
Hubbard's diaries and letters in a critical biography is not fair use), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094
(1990); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d. Cir. 1977) (overturning a district court's finding of
fair use for unauthorized excerpting of the letters of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg), cert. denied,434
U.S. 1013 (1978). But see Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding fair
use of unpublished letters in biographical work); Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142 (N.D.
Cal. 1994) (same).
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use in copyright's scheme of incentives, I" 6 incorporating privacy into
the fair use analysis is consistent with copyright's long tradition of
protecting individual privacy. In their seminal article, The Right to
Privacy,'37 Warren and Brandeis noted that common law copyright
provided individuals with an absolute right to prevent the unauthorized
publication of their unpublished works. 3 The basis for this right was
not to protect property interests, to which the economic incentives of
copyright respond, but to protect the privacy of the individual and her
ability to decide how and when to publicly disclose information that
would reveal aspects of her personality: "The principle which protects
personal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and
physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality
not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality."'' 39 Thus, common law copyright allowed40 individuals to enjoin
publication of letters, diaries, or property lists.
Judicial opinion has also recognized the personality-protecting aspect
of copyright. As early as the turn of the century, Justice Holmes, in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,14' noted that "[p]ersonality
always contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man's alone."' 4 2 The Supreme Court's recent
decision regarding whether telephone white pages directories may be
copyrighted in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,143 continues this tradition, suggesting that the originality requirement of copyright law contains an element of protection for the identity
of an author as expressed through his original works."4 The two
requirements for originality are that a work be produced independently
(i.e., not copied) and that it "display some minimal level of creativity.,"'45 Both requirements guarantee that copyright is extended only to
works that reflect their creator's unique creative abilities, thereby

136. See supra part III.A.

137. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5.
138. Id. at 198-200.

139. Id. at 205.
140. Id. at 198-203.
141. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).

142. Id. at 250.
143. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
144. See id. at 346-47 (discussing how the originality requirement of copyright depends upon
the work having a "creative component" that reflects the author's personal conceptions).

145. Id. at 358.
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displaying, at least in some small sense, their creators' personalities.'46
In contrast, works that reflect only their creators' "sweat of the
brow,"' 47 but which lack a small spark of creativity, cannot be said to
reflect their author's individuality, and are therefore not protected by
copyright.14 Further evidence of copyright's tendency to protect
privacy can be found in analyzing the doctrine's "moral
individuals'
9
right."

14

While not common among scholars and judges, the view that
copyright responds to privacy interests is now shared by at least some
members of the Supreme Court"' and commentators.' Recent fair
use cases have also implicitly recognized the privacy-protecting aspect
of copyright law. The strongest statement is Chief Judge Oaks' concurring opinion in New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt &

Co., 52 where he comments that Salinger "involved underlying, if
latent, privacy implications."' 53 Under current fair use jurisprudence,
specifically within the analytical framework of the second statutory
factor-the nature of the copyrighted work-courts frequently note that
the fact that a plaintiff's work was unpublished weighs against a finding

146. See id. at 361 ("[D]id Feist, by taking 1,309 names, towns, and telephone numbers from
Rural's white pages, copy anything that was 'original' to Rural?").
147. Id. at 360. The "sweat of the brow" theory determined if a work merited copyright
protection by the amount of time and effort put in by the creator. For a thorough discussion of the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine, see Lisa M. Weinstein, Comment, Ancient Works, Modern Dilemmas:
The Dead Sea Scrolls Copyright Case, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1637 (1994).
148. Feist, 499 U.S. at 351-61.
149. See Edward J. Damich, The Right ofPersonality:A Common-Law Basisfor the Protection
of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 82-96 (1988). For a brief description of "moral
right," see supra note 8.
150. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1984) (O'Connor, J.)
(acknowledging that the right to control first publication "implicates not only [an author's] personal
interest in creative control but his property interest in exploitation of prepublication rights"); id at
597 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that greater protection afforded unpublished works protects
the "'deliberate choice on the part of the copyright owner' to keep expression confidential').
151. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMEm, supranote 25, § 13.05[A], at 13-174 ("The scope of the fair
use doctrine is considerably narrower with respect to unpublished works that are held confidential
by their copyright owners.'); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright
Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1883-84 (1990); William F. Patry &
Shim Perlmutter, FairUse Misconstrued: Profit,Presumptions, and Parody, I I CARDOZO ARTS &
ENr. L.J. 667, 685 (1993) ("[lI]n appropriate circumstances, courts may examine [in copyright cases]
the public interest, the First Amendment, privacy concerns, or additional equitable factors."
(emphasis added)). ContraLeval, supranote 69, at 1129 ("The occasional attempt to read protection
of privacy into the copyright is ...mistaken.").
152. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
153. Id. at 585 (Oaks, CJ., concurring).
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of fair use."5 This statement is often made without reference to the
underlying policy of the fair use exception. Instead, it is simply one
factor among four, but one that is apparently given undue weight in rare
cases.
The courts' opinions that uses were not fair in cases like Lish and
Salinger is best viewed as a means by which the courts protected Lish's
and Salinger's privacy by preventing others from placing into public
circulation works that their authors intended only to be read by a limited
audience. Indeed, dicta in both Lish and Salinger reveal that the courts
in those cases were very concerned with protecting the privacy rights of
the respective authors. In Lish, the district court noted that Lish's writing
workshop is "conducted in an atmosphere of great privacy," ' and that
"next to his family the thing [Lish] cherishes the most and holds most
dear are the words that he writes."1 56 Similarly, the Second-Circuit in
Salinger noted that Salinger had never authorized publication of his
letters while he was alive, 57 that he "ha[d] chosen to shun all publicity
and inquiry concerning his private life,' 8 and that he immediately
sought to prevent the publication of the biography once he learned that
it contained excerpts from his unpublished letters. 5 9
This analysis indicates that copyright law responds not only to
economic interests, but to individual privacy interests as well. Exposing
and making explicit the role of privacy analysis in fair use cases is
important for two reasons. First, it helps rationalize and add predictability
to a murky, confusing, and indeterminate doctrine. Second, by recognizing the privacy protecting role of copyright and its application in fair use
cases involving unpublished works, this analysis lays the foundation for
expanding the role of privacy in copyright cases involving published
works as well.

154. See, e.g., Harper&Row, 471 U.S. at 564 ("Our prior discussion establishes that the scope
of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works.").
155. Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
156. Id. at 1105.
157. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92-93 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 890
(1987).
158. Id. at 92.
159. Id. at 93. The Salinger court's emphasis on privacy concerns has not gone unnoticed or
escaped criticism by other commentators. See, eg., Vincent Peppe, Comment, Fair Use of
UnpublishedMaterials in the Second Circuit: The Letters of the Law, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 417, 425
(1988) (arguing that the Salingercourt's emphasis on privacy was an improper break with precedent
that will have a chilling effect on the publication of biographies).
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B.

Expanding the Role of Privacy in FairUse Cases

The personality-protecting aspect of copyright law, which so far has
influenced courts' decisions in cases involving private letters, can and
ought to play a role in the fair use inquiry for all types of copyrighted
works." ° Any original work of authorship is entitled to copyright
protection, be it a personal letter, a diary, a historical work, a press
release, a sculpture, song lyric, or novel.16' Each different type of work
varies in the extent to which it incorporates or reflects personality traits
of its author. News reports, for example, while no doubt expressing a
point of view, are written to present "objective" representations of events.
The same is true for press releases, which are usually intended to
disseminate information. For works of this nature, the factual content of
the work is its essence, and the relationship between the personality or
identity of the work's author and the work is limited. Personal diaries are
at the opposite end of this spectrum. They record not only the events of
their author's lives, but also feelings and thoughts that may not be
intended for public dissemination. A diary entry is much more likely to
capture its author's identity than will a press release. Copyright law
generally, and fair use in particular, reflects this difference.
The relationship between the amount of "personhood" (to use
Professor Radin's term) 62 that inheres in a copyrightable work and the
type of work can be displayed diagrammatically as shown in Figure 1.
The amount of "personhood" that inheres in a copyrighted work varies
with the type of work. Any type of work, or any individual work of a
given category, will fit somewhere along this continuum.1 63

160. See Ginsburg, supra note 151, at 1884 ("Logically, the property-in-personality notion [of
copyright protection] can be extended beyond the privacy right, which controls disclosures about
oneself contained in one's unpublished writings, to the literary property right, which controls
published manifestations of oneself as revealed in one's writings").
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
162. Margaret J. Radin, Propertyand Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); see id. at 986
("[Tihe personhood perspective generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely connected
with personhood, the stronger the entitlement."). See generally Mary S. Bilder, The Shrinking Back:
The Law ofBiography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299, 333-42 (1991) (discussing the relationship between
privacy, personhood, and unpublished writing).
163. For an extreme extension of this argument, see Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell:
Parody,Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 103 (1991) (arguing
that the economically irrational refusal of some authors to sell parody rights at any price can be

explained by the fact that they "value their emotional tranquility in a manner similar to their limbs").
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1

The extent to which a copyright owner's privacy interest deserves
protection through copyright law is a function of both the personhood
inherent in the work and a number of other factors. Also relevant is
whether the original author still owns the copyrights: the purchaser of the
copyright in another's diary has hardly any claim to privacy in seeking
to prevent unauthorized use of the diary, whereas the diary's creator,
while retaining exclusive rights to the diary, has a much stronger claim.
Courts can also look to the method by which the copyrights were
transferred. Privacy interests may survive a transfer by will to a family
member or confidant; t" they are unlikely to survive an arms-length
sale. Finally, courts may look to whether the person whose privacy
interests are at issue is alive or dead. 6
In analyzing fair use, courts ought to respect the privacy-protecting
role of copyright law by balancing it against the traditionally analyzed
economic interests. This already occurs in fair use analyses of unpublished works. Where the amount of personhood in a work is high and the
author clearly desires to protect her privacy, as in Salinger'" and
Lish, 67 courts will find no fair use, even where the defendant's use has
little or no impact on the value of the plaintiff's work. On the other
hand, when a work does not capture or express its creator's identity,

164. See Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying fair use of composer Igor
Stravinsky's works, which had been bequeathed to his close confidant upon the composer's death).
165. See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1989)
(Oaks, CJ., concurring) (indicating that privacy interests of the deceased deserve less protection),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990). For another example of how these factors can affect fair use
analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 202-209.
166. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99-100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,484 U.S. 890
(1987).
167. Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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courts are more likely to find fair use, even when the defendant's work
does impinge on the commercial value of the plaintiff's work. For
example, in Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp.,16 --a case remarkably similar to Lish-the author of a previously unpublished letter sued
American Lawyer magazine, arguing that the magazine's unauthorized
publication of his letter was infringement. 69 The Second Circuit
accepted American Lawyer's fair use defense, largely because of the
factual nature of the letter, which did not implicate its author's privacy. 7 ' In contrast, in Lish, Gordon Lish's words were strongly connectnext to his family that he
ed to his personality; they were the thing
"cherishes the most and holds most dear.'' 7 1
The way in which courts ought to balance protecting authors'
privacy and economic interests through copyright law can be displayed
as follows:

I

High

Privacy

Low
High

Low
Competition
FIGURE 2

168. 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984).
169. Id. at 146.
170. Id. at 146, 148. Diamond's original suit also alleged invasion of privacy, but this state law
claim was dismissed along with the federal claim of copyright infringement. Although the Second
Circuit did not explicitly address whether or not the work at issue implicated the author's privacy
interest, the letter in question was primarily factual as opposed to expressive or creative. Id.
171. 807 F. Supp. at 1105.
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When the level of privacy implicated in a particular copyrighted work is
high, courts can give greater weight to considerations of privacy, and less
weight to the economic interests that form the mainstay of most courts'
fair use analyses. On the other hand, when a work has little to do with
its creator's personality, courts can focus primarily on the economic
aspects of copyright law and base their fair use decisions largely on the
extent to which the infringing work competes with the original."
The four statutory factors of section 107 all figure into this analysis.
The second factor-the nature of the copyrighted work-allows courts
to consider the amount of personhood at stake in the case. Courts
frequently note that predominantly factual works, like news reports, are
entitled to less protection than creative works; therefore defendants in fair
use cases have wider latitude when they use factual or utilitarian
works.'73 In contrast, courts have afforded defendants much less leeway
in cases involving works of art 74 or personal letters, 75 both of which
capture more of their creators' personalities. And, as discussed above,
courts also consider whether a work was or was not published as part of
the fair use analysis.'76
The remaining three factors all relate to the amount of competition
the defendant's work creates for the plaintiff's work, thereby measuring
the impact that the infringement has on the original author's creative
incentives. 7 7 As the Supreme Court has noted, a commercial use under
the first factor is likely to compete with the plaintiff's work, or at least
has that potential; accordingly, commercial uses are presumptively
unfair. 7 The third factor-the amount copied-also bears on competi-

172.
173.
Handgun
programs

See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990); National Rifle Ass'n of Am. v.
Control Fed'n, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 71 (1994). Computer
are also subject to liberal fair use, largely because of their functional characteristics. See

Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 944 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992).
174. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir.) ("[C]opyright protection extends
only to those components of the work that are original to the creator. But the quantity of originality
that need be shown is modest-only a dash of it will do.") (citation omitted), cert.denied, 113 S. Ct.
365 (1992).
175. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 890 (1987); Lish v. Harper's Magazine Found., 807 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
176. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
177. See L. Ray Patterson, UnderstandingFairUse, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 249,264-65
(1992) (arguing that all four of § 107's factors relate to the economic impact of the use).
178. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) ("[E]very

commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly
privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright ... .'); see id. at 449 ("If the Betamax were
used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be
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tion-the more copied, the more likely the defendant's work will usurp
the market for the original work. 1 9
Courts can modulate the amount of competition they will allow
while still finding fair use by varying the amount of evidence of direct

competition they require. Currently, courts differ in the extent to which
they require proof of direct competition or loss to a plaintiff under their
analysis of the fourth fair use factor. Some courts focus on whether the
defendant used the plaintiff's work in a way in which the plaintiff had
exploited the work in the past, thereby actually falfilling the market for
the original work.'
Other courts simply assume that because the
defendant's use was commercially profitable, the plaintiff could have
exploited her work in that way, and that the defendant's use therefore had
the effect of decreasing the value of the plaintiff's work by satisfying a
demand for the work that the plaintiff could have exploited."'

To protect an author's privacy by limiting the scope of fair use of
works that strongly implicate the copyright owner's privacy, courts ought
to adopt the test of whether the use is one which the plaintiff could have
exploited. The answer will invariably be yes, causing this factor to weigh

against a finding of fair use. Where courts can be less concerned with
unfair."). In its most recent statement on the issue, the Court has backed away from Sony's strong
presumption that commercial uses are unfair. "If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force
against a finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed
in the preamble paragraph of § 107 ....
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164,
1174 (1994). Still, a commercial use "is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of
fair use."' Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)). This
led the Court in Campbell to remand the case for a determination of the impact of the defendant's
work on the market value of the original copyrighted work (the fourth of § 107's factors).
179. Campbell makes clear that market substitution is the type of injury copyright protects
against. 114 S. Ct. at 1177.
180. See, e.g., Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d
57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that defendant's use fulfilled market for plaintiff's work, as evidenced
by plaintiff's unsuccessful efforts to license his work to defendant for the use in which the defendant
ultimately made); New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517,
1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that plaintiff was negotiating to license the "Freddy Krueger" character
from the Nightmare on Elm Street series when defendant produced his own rap song based on
"Freddy"); see also Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright 30 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 232-36 (1982) (arguing that courts tend to focus on competition in
the market for which the original work was intended to compete or in closely bordering markets).
181. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (inferring harm to
plaintiff through market substitution from the fact that the original and the alleged parody were
"competitors in the entertainment field"); Hi-Tech Video Prods. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 804 F.
Supp. 950, 954-56 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (presuming harm to plaintiff from commercial nature of
defendant's use), rev'd on other grounds, 58 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1995). For a more complete
discussion of this actual/potential market exploitation distinction, see supratext accompanying notes
62-68.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss1/3

32

19951

AND FAIR USE
COPYRIGHT PRIVACY,
Thau: Copyright,
Privacy,

and Fair Use

protecting an author's privacy, they could instead require actual proof
that the defendant's use did in fact compete with a use the plaintiff had
exploited or intended to exploit." 2 This would enable courts to avoid
relying on hindsight-aided hypotheses in drawing their conclusions as to
what plaintiffs could have done. The result would be that low-privacy
copyrights would be subject to liberal fair uses, while the fair use of
high-privacy copyrights works would be much more restricted.
C. Applying the Privacy/CompetitionMatrix
The preceding discussion indicates that courts are already sensitive
to the privacy-protecting aspects of copyright in the context of unpublished works. This part aims to demonstrate how courts operate within
the privacy/competition matrix, both for cases in which privacy concerns
are most obvious, such as Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,8 3 and for
cases in which privacy plays a more latent role."8
Several cases reveal how the privacy-protecting aspect of copyright
law has influenced fair use decisions. As already discussed, Salinger
demonstrates that, in extreme situations, courts have explicitly responded
to copyright owners' privacy interests to prevent unauthorized publication
of personal material.18 5 Several other cases are also illustrative: in
Rogers v. Koons,186 the Second Circuit affirmed a district court's
rejection of a fair use defense for the unauthorized adaptation of a
photograph by a renowned modem artist; in Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell,8 7 the same court upheld the district court's finding of fair
use for the unauthorized excerpting of a book about women who have
had abortions by the author of a second commercially sold book critical
of the abortion rights movement; and in Iowa State University Research
Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 88 the court rejected
American Broadcasting Companies' ("ABC") fair use defense for its
broadcasting of eight percent of a twenty-eight minute student-produced
documentary about a wrestler competing in the Olympics.

182. See Goldstein, supra note 180, at 232-36.
183. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).

184. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992);
Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 155-59.
186. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
187. 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
188. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).
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These four cases can be placed in the privacy/competition matrix as
follows:

High

i Salineer I

Privacy

Low
Low

High
Competition
FIGURE 3

In Salinger, the works in question were personal letters that strongly
implicated J.D. Salinger's personhood. Furthermore, his privacy interest
was clear from his behavior: he was a recluse, shunned publicity, and
made it abundantly clear that he did not want his personal letters
excerpted in a biography. 89 Accordingly, the Second Circuit rejected
Random House's claim of fair use despite finding that the competitive
effect on the market value of the letters was not particularly great.' 90
Rogers v. Koons 91 provides another example of a court's restrictive application of fair use involving artistic works. In Rogers, the work
in question was a photograph by a successful California photographer
189. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 92-93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,484 U.S. 890
(1987).
190. Id. at 99 ("[T]he [biography] would not displace the market for the letters .... [M]ost of
the potential purchasers of a collection of the letters would not be dissuaded by publication of the

biography."). Despite the above findings, the court concluded that some market displacement was
likely and therefore that the all-important fourth factor in the fair use analysis "weigh[ed] slightly
in Salinger's favor." Id.
191. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992).
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that had been licensed for reproduction on notecards. 92 One of those
notecards was used by a renowned modem artist as the basis for a
sculpture, three copies of which were sold to collectors for a total of
$367,000.' In rejecting the artist's fair use defense, the court emphasized the amount of creative work that the photographer put into his
photograph. "Rogers drew on his years of artistic development. He
selected the light, the location, the bench on which the [subjects we]re
seated and the arrangement of the [subjects]. He also made creative
judgments concerning technical matters with his camera and the use of
natural light."' 4 This was not just a snapshot, it was a work of art in
which the artist had invested his skills and training. Thus, the court
viewed the photograph, which the defendant saw as "typical, commonplace and familiar,"'95 as an extension of its creator, embodying a high
degree of the photographer's "personhood."' To find the use unfair,
the court needed no evidence that the sculpture had any competitive
impact on the plaintiffs work or that it would in any way reduce
plaintiff's incentives to take, produce, and disseminate artistic photo7
graphs.

9

Rogers contrasts with Iowa State University Research Foundation,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.19 8 -a case in which it was alleged
that ABC improperly included excerpts from a locally produced
documentary during its broadcast of the Olympics.' 9 Unlike Rogers,
there is no indication in the Iowa State court's discussion of the
documentary that it was any more than a pedestrian home-made film
about a local athlete; it was not a work personal to its creator. Accordingly, in denying ABC's claim of fair use, the court focused primarily on
the fact that, by broadcasting portions of the film during its Olympic
broadcast, ABC foreclosed what was likely the most significant potential
market for the work.2" That ABC's activity directly competed with

192. Id. at 304.
193. Id. at 305.
194. Id. at 304.

195. Id. at 305.
196. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
197. Rogers, 960 F.2d at 312 (finding without evidence that a competitive effect of the defendant's work on the plaintiff's work was "not implausible"). I place this case to the right of Salinger
on the privacy/competition matrix only because the plaintiff had licensed his works, and the

particular work in question, for other uses, indicating that a competitive effect was not as unlikely
as the court suggests. See supra FIGURE 3.
198. 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).

199. Id. at 58.
200. Id. at 62.
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plaintiff is demonstrated by plaintiff's attempt to license the documentary
to ABC for precisely the same use to which ABC ultimately put it.20'
Finally, Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell2 2 demonstrates how the
privacy interests implicated by a copyright may differ from the amount
of personhood inherent in the work at issue and how this affects the fair
use analysis.20 3 In a book chronicling the experiences of women who
had undergone illegal abortions, Katrina Maxtone-Graham included
excerpts from seventeen interviews with women who had aborted their
pregnancies before abortion became legal. James Burtchaell, a Catholic
priest who wished to "critique the published accounts of 'abortion veterans,' '?204 included in his anti-abortion book excerpts from the interviews
included in Maxtone-Graham's book. Maxtone-Graham, as owner of the
copyrights in the interviews, 20' alleged copyright infringement, but the
court found that Burtchaell's use was fair.2
Maxtone-Graham illustrates the importance of distinguishing the
privacy interests of the copyright owner from those of the original author
of a work. The interviewees, having obtained illegal and potentially
stigmatic abortions, clearly had very strong privacy interests at stake in
the way their stories were told. Their interests had already been protected
by Maxtone-Graham in her original publication--she changed their
names to protect their identities and their privacy.2" 7 Maxtone-Graham,
the actual copyright holder, had little of her own privacy at stake in the
publication of these interviews, and the court therefore had no trouble
finding that Burtchaell's use was fair under the four factor analysis.0 s
Had the interviewees retained the copyrights to their interviews and sued
Burtchaell themselves, this case would likely have been decided in much
the same manner as Salinger,with the privacy interests of the interviewees outweighing the other aspects of the fair use analysis. 2"

201. Id. at 59, 61.
202. 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987).
203. See id; supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
204. Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1256.
205. The interviewees had assigned their rights in the interviews to Maxtone-Graham. Id.
206. Id. at 1255, 1265.
207. Id. at 1256.
208. Id. at 1260-65.
209. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir.) ("Salinger has a right to
protect the expressive content of his unpublished writings for the term of his copyright, and that right
prevails over a claim of fair use under 'ordinary circumstances."), cert. denied,484 U.S. 890 (1987).
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V. BENEFITS OF INCLUDING PRIVACY PROTECTION IN
FAIR USE ANALYSIS

A.

Fulfilling Copyright's ConstitutionalPurpose

Courts and commentators widely agree that the purpose of copyright
is to increase the social store of original works of authorship.21
Accordingly, copyright provides economic incentives for authors to
create works. Not all authors write in response to economic incentives,
however,2" and, by allowing authors to control the distribution of their
works, copyright encourages the production of personal works that
authors do not intend to distribute or use to generate income. A fair use
analysis based on both economic and privacy interests adequately
protects the incentives to create all types of works by responding to the
different interests that lead people to create. Personal works are protected
under this analysis to a greater extent than nonpersonal ones, thereby
assuring authors who create for noneconomic reasons that their privacy
will be respected. Works created for economic reasons, on the other
hand, are protected to the extent necessary to ensure that authors realize
the economic benefits to which they are entitled.2 12
A fair use analysis based solely on the economic aspects of
copyright would protect the latter category of works, but it would
threaten works that implicate their authors' privacy by allowing these
works to be used without their authors' consent. The effect would be
either to decrease the rate at which these works are produced or to
provide the owners of such works incentives to conceal or even destroy
them to prevent them from falling into the hands of would-be fair
users. 3 In addition, a wide scope of fair use for highly personal works

210. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169 (1994); Harper &
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985); Leval, supra note 69, at 1107
("[Copyright] is designed ... to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual
enrichment of the public.").
211. But see Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174 ('"[N]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for
money."' (quoting 3 BOSWELL'S Lr OF JOHNSON 19 (G.B. Hill ed., L.F. Powell rev., 1934))).
Apparently J.D. Salinger and all the diarists among us are blockheads.
212. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that ex-President
Ford's "'confidentiality' interest" in preventing unauthorized prepublication of his memoirs "is no
more than an economic interest in capturing the full value of initial release of information to the
public, and is properly analyzed as such").
213. Cf Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 675, 706 (1993) (noting that "the threat that copyright would not protect creations from being
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may reduce
the amount of access authors of such works grant to the
14
2

public.

At the same time, providing wider latitude for fair use of works that
do not implicate an author's privacy is consistent with the purposes of
copyright. Most of the works that will fall into this category are
utilitarian works, such as news reports and compilations, and society's
interest in the free flow of information is promoted by encouraging the
dissemination of these types of works. If fair use is routinely allowed for
works of this type, authors of such works will have an incentive to
capitalize them to prevent market diminution. If they do not, others
should be allowed to. Still, by giving authors the first opportunity to
exploit their works, copyright preserves the economic incentives
necessary to foster creativity.
The argument that fair use should respond to privacy interests is not
without its critics. Judge Leval, who was the district court judge in both
Salinger and New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt &
Co.,2 15 offers three reasons against considering privacy in fair use
cases: (1) the law's policy of favoring free speech weighs against using
privacy to muzzle speech;2" 6 (2) it would distort the current "delicate
balance of interests achieved under our privacy law" by allowing privacy
protection to extend through the life of a copyright rather than ending at
death21 7 and also possibly by causing federal copyright law to preempt
state law's privacy protection;1 8 and (3) copyright law is "grotesquely
inappropriate
to protect privacy" because it protects only expression, not
219
facts.
Judge Leval's first explanation is not particularly persuasive in light
of cases like Salinger and Lish, which clearly favored privacy interests
over free speech. His second argument depends upon a conception of

used in foreseen but unintended ways could discourage creative effort").
214. In several fair use cases, scholars had access to personal writings that had been donated
to university libraries on condition that they not be reproduced. See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.,
953 F.2d 731, 734 (2d Cir. 1991); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987); Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 144 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
215. 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
216. Leval, supra note 69, at 1129.
217. Id. at 1129-30. The term of a copyright for most works is the life of the author plus 50
years. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
218. See Leval, supra note 69, at 1130. Section 301 of the Copyright Act declares that state
interests concurrent with interests created by the Copyright Act are preempted. 17 U.S.C. § 301
(1994).
219. Leval, supra note 69, at 1130.
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privacy interests in copyright law that is identical to the privacy interests
protected under state law. The privacy interests described in this Article,
however, are unlike those addressed by state law, as most state laws
protect only against the unwarranted disclosure of private facts. 220 In
contrast, the privacy interests implicated by recent fair use decisions
extend beyond facts to include the copyrighted expression that was
central to the personhood of each author." Because this interest is
different from those protected by state law, it need not be treated
identically. As already discussed, a number of factors determine the
extent or amount of a copyright owner's privacy at stake in a given
case,' including whether the author is living, and courts can use these
factors when making equitable fair use determinations. Thus, recognizing
privacy interests in fair use cases will not require courts to automatically
extend the state law right to privacy to the term of an author's copyright.
It simply does not raise the preemption issue Judge Leval anticipates.'
The distinction between state law of privacy and copyright law of
privacy also highlights the fallacy of Judge Leval's final argument
against recognizing privacy interests in fair use cases. The privacy
interests implicated in copyright stem first from the nature of the work,
not from the facts contained therein. While the factual nature of a work
will be relevant to this inquiry, the privacy inquiry does not end
there. 2 4
B.

Solving the Problem of Unpublished Works

Adding privacy analysis to the framework through which fair use is
analyzed also helps clarify the way copyright ought to treat unpublished
works. Unpublished works pose a problem for current fair use analysis
because of their status prior to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Until the 1976 Act became effective, statutory copyright only vested in
works upon publication. Unpublished works were protected instead by

220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
221. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65.

223. Specifically, statutory preemption under § 301 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301
(1994), does not occur if the state law claim that might be preempted contains an "extra element"
in addition to the elements that would have to be proven to make out a claim of infringement under
the Copyright Act. 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 98, § 15.2.1.2. Each of the state law privacy rights
listed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) contain elements that would not have
to be proven in a copyright claim and are therefore not subject to statutory preemption under the

copyright laws.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 162-65.
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common law copyright, which provided wide-ranging protection for an
individual's privacy.' Under common law copyright, for example, the

owner of a collection of paintings could obtain an injunction to prevent
the unauthorized publication of a catalog describing the paintings, or

even a listing of their existence. There was no concept of fair use;
protection was absolute against the world and based largely on the
concept of the privacy of the individual invoking the protection. 6
By vesting copyright protection in the creators of original works of
authorship upon the work's fixation in a tangible medium of expres-

sion, 2 ' the Copyright Act of 1976 subsumed under statutory copyright
protection almost all of the protection that had previously been afforded
under common law copyright.228 As a result, fair use became a defense
for the first time to infringement in cases of unpublished works. 229 The
language of section 107, which requires courts to consider the four
statutory fair use factors, compels judges to analyze fair use in contexts
where there is little common law history and where the concept 30
of fair
use is in fundamental conflict with a plaintiff's privacy interests.
How then should courts deal with fair use for unpublished works?

One option is simply to extend the common law limitation and apply fair
225. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 5, at 198-200.
226. Id.
227. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
228. See Roberta R. Kwall, Copyright and The Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1985) ("Perhaps the most significant reform of the 1976
[Copyright] Act is the adoption of a unitary federal system of copyright protection in lieu of the
prior system under which federal law protected published works and state law governed unpublished
works.").
229. See generally Andrea D. Williams, The Fair Use Doctrine and Unpublished Works, 34
How. L. J. 115 (1991) (discussing the application of the fair use doctrine in cases involving unpublished works, such as Harper& Row and Salinger).
230. For a discussion of how courts, Congress, and interested parties, such as publishers and
the computer industry, view this problem, see Jonathan Band & Laura L.F.H. McDonald, The Fair
Use Bill: A Funny Thing Happenedon the Way to Congress, COMPUTER LAW., March 1993, at 9.
The common way that courts deal with this history is to consider that the work was unpublished
under their analysis of factor two-the nature of the work-and to note that this weighs against fair
use. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,484 U.S. 890
(1987). As it was originally conceived in Justice Story's famous opinion of Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass 1841) (No. 4,901), however, factor two could not have embraced the
published/unpublished distinction because unpublished works were not subject to the fair use inquiry
at all. See PATRY, supra note 26, at 533, 536. Rather, this analysis seems to follow from the
Supreme Court's recent attempt to expand the fair use defense to uses of unpublished works
following passage of the 1976 Copyright Act. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985). Under traditional fair use analysis (which only applied to uses of
published works), the inquiry under the second fair use factor addressed whether the work was a
factual work or work of fancy. See, eg., id. at 563.
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use only in cases involving published works. This approach, however,
has two significant problems.23 First, it is clearly contrary to the plain
language of section 107, which requires courts to consider the four
statutory factors in addressing whether or not a use is fair.232 Courts
could avoid this problem by establishing as a threshold test whether or
not the work was published before engaging in any fair use analysis.
Such a fundamental shift, however, would require overturning a
significant body of caselaw and would be virtually impossible to justify
given the statute's clear language.233

The second flaw is that publication is itself a hard concept to define.
In large part, the reason the 1976 Act extended statutory copyright
protection to unpublished works is that modem technology had rendered

the determination of when a work was first published problematic.234 By

making the threshold for copyright protection fixation in a tangible
medium of expression, Congress sought to eliminate the uncertainty
pervasive under the publication test whether a work was protected by the
statute.235 Reestablishing publication as a governing principle in

copyright law in fair use cases would be a step backward as it would
destroy the certainty gained by doing away with the test in the first place.

Instead of making a strict published/unpublished distinction, courts
ought to ask whether the unpublished nature of the work reflects the
creator's privacy interest, as c-pposed to her economic interest in

capitalizing on prepublication. Recent caselaw involving fair use of

231. In addition to the arguments presented here, which are primarily doctrinal, others have
argued that eliminating the possibility of fair use for unpublished works is contrary to copyright's
goal of increasing society's store of knowledge. See Robin Feingold, Note, Fhen "FairIs Foul":
A Narrow Reading of the FairUse Doctrine in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 72
CORNELL L. REv. 218 (1986); Lisa V. Merrill, Note, Should Copyright Law Make Unpublished
Works Unfair Game?, 51 OHtO ST. L.J. 1399 (1990). Applying the privacy/competition matrix to
fair use cases involving unpublished works avoids the shortcomings of a categorical prohibition
against fair use of unpublished works.
232. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 595 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include .... .") (emphasis added); supra
text accompanying note 27.
234. See Paul S. Bilker, Note, The Showdown Continues at the Circle C Ranch: NonPreemption of State Copyright Protectionfor Unfixed Improvisational Works, 18 Sw. U. L. REV.
415, 419-20 (1989) ("The proliferation of twentieth century methods of communication... has
caused varied interpretations of 'publication' as applied to these new forms of dissemination, leading
to unpredictable results in individual situations." (footnote omitted)).
235. See id. at 420 (noting that the tangible/intangible test for statutory protection created by
the fixation requirement provides a clearer dividing line than the published/unpublished test that it
replaced).
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private, personal unpublished works suggests that courts have been
focusing primarily on the privacy aspects of copyright protection in
denying fair use to defendants who tried to use those works without
licenses.236 There remains the problem of a fair use defense in a case
involving the infringing use of an unpublished nonprivate work, like an
unpublished yellow pages directory. Consistent with the privacy/competition analysis, works of this type ought to be subject to liberal
fair use: Before finding against fair use, courts should require clear
evidence of direct competition in the potential market for the unpublished
work coupled to a finding that the owner of the unpublished work
intends to publish the work. This analysis allows the creators of such
works the opportunity to exploit them commercially, but it also protects
society's interest in the dissemination of works of this type by giving
wider scope to fair use analysis.2 37 If the creator of a socially valuable
work is not willing to exploit the work on her own, society should be
allowed to enjoy the work's benefits through liberal fair use.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While copyright law has long been recognized as serving a variety
of competing economic and noneconomic interests, judicial opinion and
academic scholarship analyzing fair use has focused almost exclusively
on the economic impact of fair use and its relationship to the production
and dissemination of copyrightable works. The result has been a muddled
doctrine and a series of hard-to-reconcile cases. This Article has aimed
to clarify fair use by exposing how courts engaged in fair use inquiries
are often responsive to the privacy interests of the copyright plaintiffs
before them. Courts' use of fair use to protect individual's privacy is
consistent with copyright's longstanding tradition of responding to
privacy concerns. In addition, privacy analysis can aid courts in dealing
with fair use of unpublished works, avoiding unnecessary application of
rigid and possibly overbroad rules.
By incorporating both privacy and economic interests in fair use
analysis, as illustrated by the privacy/competition matrix, courts can
apply fair use in a way that furthers the ultimate goal of copyright.
Contrary to Samuel Johnson's Supreme Court-endorsed quip that "[n]o

236. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
237. See supra part V.A.
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man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money,"238 some copyrighted works are not produced with economic incentive in mind. Scholars'
and courts' emphases on economics in fair use analysis threatens to lead
fair use down a path that would create disincentives for the creation of
private personal works. So far courts have resisted this trend, but they
have done so by manipulating section 107's four factors rather than by
expressly acknowledging the privacy interests that they are actually
seeking to protect. Making explicit the role of privacy in fair use would
enable courts to promote effectively the purposes of copyright: encouraging the creation of creative and useful copyrightable works.
The privacy/competition matrix does not eliminate all or even most
of the ambiguity from fair use. At its core, fair use remains a flexible
doctrine that courts can use to promote ostensibly utilitarian ends... or,
simply, to balance equities." What the matrix does, however, is to
highlight the importance of privacy as a factor to be weighed in courts'
balancing tests.

238. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994) (quoting 3 BOSWELL'S
LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G.B. Hill ed., L.F. Powell rev., 1934)).
239. See Dratler, supranote 69, at 245-47; Fisher, supra note 59, at 1687-88; Leval, supranote
69, at 1105-10.
240. See Weinreb, supra note 122, at 1161.
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